Former CIA analyst openly contemptuous of neoconman during PBS interview
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Preliminary comment by MORRISSEY BREEN, Daisycutter Sports:
We recommend that you read the following transcript of a recent PBS
television interview by Margaret Warner, of former CIA analyst RAY
McGOVERN, one of a number of principled and brave American intelligence
officers who have spoken out against the lies and distortions of Bush's
gang of thieves and neoconmen.
RAY McGOVERN: No, I don't believe that that's possible at all. Who
would know better than the head of the CIA as to whether the
intelligence and facts were being fixed to fit the policy.
We recommend that you read the following transcript of a recent PBS
television interview by Margaret Warner, of former CIA analyst RAY
McGOVERN, one of a number of principled and brave American intelligence
officers who have spoken out against the lies and distortions of Bush's
gang of thieves and neoconmen.
For the sake of some notion of "balance", PBS management has obviously
decided to include one REUEL GERECHT, from an extreme right wing "think
tank" called the American Enterprise Institute. As the conversation
progresses, it becomes painfully obvious that this fellow has nothing
with which to counter Mr McGovern's meticulous accumulation of damning
evidence. At several points during Gerecht's blithering, threadbare
litany of denial, you can hear McGovern snorting in astonishment,
disdain even amusement.
decided to include one REUEL GERECHT, from an extreme right wing "think
tank" called the American Enterprise Institute. As the conversation
progresses, it becomes painfully obvious that this fellow has nothing
with which to counter Mr McGovern's meticulous accumulation of damning
evidence. At several points during Gerecht's blithering, threadbare
litany of denial, you can hear McGovern snorting in astonishment,
disdain even amusement.
At one stage Gerecht asserts, with a straight face, that "the
administration had not tried to distort the intelligence, had not tried
to manhandle CIA analysts." His source for this? Yep, you guessed it
--- the utterly discredited, internationally derided Robb-Silverman
whitewash. When Gerecht comes out with that howler, Ray McGovern
almost splits his sides laughing. I'm sure that even the normally
unflappable Margaret Warner was struggling to hold it together at that
point.
administration had not tried to distort the intelligence, had not tried
to manhandle CIA analysts." His source for this? Yep, you guessed it
--- the utterly discredited, internationally derided Robb-Silverman
whitewash. When Gerecht comes out with that howler, Ray McGovern
almost splits his sides laughing. I'm sure that even the normally
unflappable Margaret Warner was struggling to hold it together at that
point.
Now READ ON....
WAR MEMOS
June 16, 2005
With audible snorts and guffaws inserted by MORRISSEY BREEN, for Radio
Transcripts Ltd, a division of Daisycutter Sports Inc.
June 16, 2005
With audible snorts and guffaws inserted by MORRISSEY BREEN, for Radio
Transcripts Ltd, a division of Daisycutter Sports Inc.
The controversy surrounding the "Downing Street memos" continues to
grow. The documents, a series of 2002 British memos about President
Bush inventing pretexts to invade Iraq, were recently leaked to the
media.
grow. The documents, a series of 2002 British memos about President
Bush inventing pretexts to invade Iraq, were recently leaked to the
media.
10 Downing Street, London
TERENCE SMITH: Behind that famous door, the residence of British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, top British officials gathered in July 2002 to
discuss a possible war in Iraq. But minutes of that discussion only
surfaced on May 1 of this year in the heat of Blair's re-election
campaign. First published by the Sunday Times of London, it came to be
known as the "Downing Street Memo."
TERENCE SMITH: Behind that famous door, the residence of British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, top British officials gathered in July 2002 to
discuss a possible war in Iraq. But minutes of that discussion only
surfaced on May 1 of this year in the heat of Blair's re-election
campaign. First published by the Sunday Times of London, it came to be
known as the "Downing Street Memo."
The invasion itself commenced on March 20, 2003, but the memo suggested
that the Bush administration was deciding on invading nine months
earlier. The memo said Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, concluded
from his July 2002 talks in Washington: "Military action was now seen
as inevitable; justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD." That
"Bush wanted to remove Saddam" through military action, and that
"intelligence and facts were being fixed" around the policy.
that the Bush administration was deciding on invading nine months
earlier. The memo said Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, concluded
from his July 2002 talks in Washington: "Military action was now seen
as inevitable; justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD." That
"Bush wanted to remove Saddam" through military action, and that
"intelligence and facts were being fixed" around the policy.
This past week, seven other classified memos came to light, some dating
back to March 2002, detailing even earlier indications of the
administration's desire to oust Saddam and that military planning was
well underway. This March 14 memo from Sir David Manning, Blair's key
foreign policy adviser, reported on a dinner with then-National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. It noted, "Condi's enthusiasm for
regime change is undimmed." But the president wanted Blair's advice
before making political decisions to go to war.
back to March 2002, detailing even earlier indications of the
administration's desire to oust Saddam and that military planning was
well underway. This March 14 memo from Sir David Manning, Blair's key
foreign policy adviser, reported on a dinner with then-National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. It noted, "Condi's enthusiasm for
regime change is undimmed." But the president wanted Blair's advice
before making political decisions to go to war.
The memos also appeared at odds with public statements by the
president, vice president and other top officials that the final
decision to go to war came only in March 2003. The Downing Street Memos
were picked up by several bloggers, but received little attention in
the mainstream media until last week during Prime Minister Blair's
brief visit to Washington. On the NewsHour, Gwen Ifill asked the prime
minister if he'd known about the memo.
president, vice president and other top officials that the final
decision to go to war came only in March 2003. The Downing Street Memos
were picked up by several bloggers, but received little attention in
the mainstream media until last week during Prime Minister Blair's
brief visit to Washington. On the NewsHour, Gwen Ifill asked the prime
minister if he'd known about the memo.
TONY BLAIR: They take bits out here of this memo or that memo, or
something someone's supposed to have said at the time, and what people
ignore is we went through a very open, obvious process through the
United Nations and the issue was how did you -- because the view I
took, as the president did, was we had to enforce United Nations
resolutions against countries that were developing and proliferating
WMD, that after Sept. 11 the world had changed, we had to take a
definitive stand.
something someone's supposed to have said at the time, and what people
ignore is we went through a very open, obvious process through the
United Nations and the issue was how did you -- because the view I
took, as the president did, was we had to enforce United Nations
resolutions against countries that were developing and proliferating
WMD, that after Sept. 11 the world had changed, we had to take a
definitive stand.
The place to start was Iraq because it was a breach of U.N. resolutions
and instead of going straight to conflict, which we would have done,
had this been the done deal everyone accuses us of, we went through the
United Nations to give it a last chance. But it didn't work,
unfortunately.
and instead of going straight to conflict, which we would have done,
had this been the done deal everyone accuses us of, we went through the
United Nations to give it a last chance. But it didn't work,
unfortunately.
TERENCE SMITH: President Bush responded at an afternoon news conference
that same day.
that same day.
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH: Somebody said we had made up our mind to use
military force to deal with Saddam. There is nothing farther from the
truth. My conversation with the prime minister was, "How can we do this
peacefully?"
military force to deal with Saddam. There is nothing farther from the
truth. My conversation with the prime minister was, "How can we do this
peacefully?"
TERENCE SMITH: Today in Washington, the issue gathered more steam as
congressional Democrats held a forum to discuss it. In the Senate,
Democratic Leader Harry Reid cited the British memo as one more reason
to delay a vote on the nomination of John Bolton as United Nations
ambassador. But at the White House today, Press Secretary Scott
McClellan said the administration would not respond to the Democrats
because it was not interested in rehashing what he called "old
debates."
congressional Democrats held a forum to discuss it. In the Senate,
Democratic Leader Harry Reid cited the British memo as one more reason
to delay a vote on the nomination of John Bolton as United Nations
ambassador. But at the White House today, Press Secretary Scott
McClellan said the administration would not respond to the Democrats
because it was not interested in rehashing what he called "old
debates."
The original "Downing Street memo"
MARGARET WARNER: So what do these memos from 2002 tell us about the
timing of President Bush's decision to invade Iraq? To assess that
issue, we're joined by two former CIA officials. Ray McGovern was a CIA
analyst for 27 years. He retired 15 years ago, and is now a member of
the group Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. He appeared as
a witness at today's Democratic forum. And Reuel Gerecht was a CIA
Middle East operations officer until the mid-'90s. He's now a resident
fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Welcome to you both.
timing of President Bush's decision to invade Iraq? To assess that
issue, we're joined by two former CIA officials. Ray McGovern was a CIA
analyst for 27 years. He retired 15 years ago, and is now a member of
the group Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity. He appeared as
a witness at today's Democratic forum. And Reuel Gerecht was a CIA
Middle East operations officer until the mid-'90s. He's now a resident
fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Welcome to you both.
Mr. McGovern, beginning with you, okay, make your case, take the
original Downing Street Memo from July 2003. How does that prove, as
you critics charge, that President Bush that early, July 2002, had
decided to go to war?
original Downing Street Memo from July 2003. How does that prove, as
you critics charge, that President Bush that early, July 2002, had
decided to go to war?
RAY McGOVERN: Well, let me first say that I'm not out to make a case.
I'm a professional intelligence officer, retired, who has the ethos of
just trying to find out where the facts lead me.
I'm a professional intelligence officer, retired, who has the ethos of
just trying to find out where the facts lead me.
The facts here are this: On July 23, 2002, Richard Dearlove, the head
of Britain's CIA, came back from a long visit to Washington where he
consulted with the top U.S. officials including George Tenet, his
opposite number. His big news was threefold: There had been a major
change and now war was seen as inevitable. The president was determined
to remove Saddam Hussein by force, and force regime change that way;
that this was to be, in quotes, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD.
of Britain's CIA, came back from a long visit to Washington where he
consulted with the top U.S. officials including George Tenet, his
opposite number. His big news was threefold: There had been a major
change and now war was seen as inevitable. The president was determined
to remove Saddam Hussein by force, and force regime change that way;
that this was to be, in quotes, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD.
Now let me translate that from British English -- justified by the
thought that Iraq has all this weapons of mass destruction, and is
likely to give it to terrorists. And finally, when Jack Straw, the
foreign minister said, well, the evidence on weapons of mass
destruction is rather thin was his word, Dearlove, the head of the
British intelligence says, no problem; the intelligence and the facts
are being fixed around the policy.
thought that Iraq has all this weapons of mass destruction, and is
likely to give it to terrorists. And finally, when Jack Straw, the
foreign minister said, well, the evidence on weapons of mass
destruction is rather thin was his word, Dearlove, the head of the
British intelligence says, no problem; the intelligence and the facts
are being fixed around the policy.
This is documentary. This is a secret minutes of this meeting prepared
the same day; it's of a different species of all the other
circumstantial evidence we have that the president had long since
decided to do war. And so the circumstances, you can forget
circumstantial, we have a flaming -- we have a smoking gun here, and we
have something equivalent to the Nixon tapes on Watergate.
the same day; it's of a different species of all the other
circumstantial evidence we have that the president had long since
decided to do war. And so the circumstances, you can forget
circumstantial, we have a flaming -- we have a smoking gun here, and we
have something equivalent to the Nixon tapes on Watergate.
MARGARET WARNER: Reuel Gerecht, if you read this memo certainly looks
like head of British intelligence had come to these very same
conclusions, these conclusions.
like head of British intelligence had come to these very same
conclusions, these conclusions.
REUEL GERECHT: Well, that's not actually, I think, clear. I mean it's
not impossible that the head of British intelligence for example was
opposed to the war and might take interpretation as way from Washington
that would reinforce that position.
not impossible that the head of British intelligence for example was
opposed to the war and might take interpretation as way from Washington
that would reinforce that position.
What we do know beyond a shadow of a doubt is that the Robb-Silverman
commission, which is certainly the most exhaustive treatment of the WMD
and war in Iraq issue, came away with a very clear judgment that the
president of the United States, the administration had not tried to
distort the intelligence, had not tried to manhandle CIA analysts.
commission, which is certainly the most exhaustive treatment of the WMD
and war in Iraq issue, came away with a very clear judgment that the
president of the United States, the administration had not tried to
distort the intelligence, had not tried to manhandle CIA analysts.
RAY McGOVERN: [Snort!]
REUEL GERECHT: In fact, the opposite conclusion was drawn. And that is
that they should have challenged CIA analysts much more rigorously on
the information they had about WMD.
that they should have challenged CIA analysts much more rigorously on
the information they had about WMD.
MARGARET WARNER: So are you saying that these are Dearlove's
conclusions, but that doesn't prove that this was in fact the state of
play in Washington.
conclusions, but that doesn't prove that this was in fact the state of
play in Washington.
REUEL GERECHT: No, I don't think so at all. In fact, for those who are
in Washington who may know individuals inside the government,
particularly inside the Pentagon, which everybody assumes, it was the
most pro-war section of the administration. I mean, a lot of people had
a great deal of hesitation, reservations that in fact the United States
was going to go to war even as late as the fall of 2002. The suggestion
here that everything was more or less a foregone conclusion I think is
really pretty tendentious and not historically credible.
Setting US policy
in Washington who may know individuals inside the government,
particularly inside the Pentagon, which everybody assumes, it was the
most pro-war section of the administration. I mean, a lot of people had
a great deal of hesitation, reservations that in fact the United States
was going to go to war even as late as the fall of 2002. The suggestion
here that everything was more or less a foregone conclusion I think is
really pretty tendentious and not historically credible.
Setting US policy
MARGARET WARNER: So, Mr. McGovern, let's talk about the Dearlove
conclusions here, because isn't this fairly fourth-hand. In other
words, these notes are being written by a foreign policy aide about a
meeting, they're minutes. He's reporting what Dearlove report based on
his conversations with George Tenet in Washington, about what Tenet
thinks the state of play is, say, at the White House, and in the
administration.
conclusions here, because isn't this fairly fourth-hand. In other
words, these notes are being written by a foreign policy aide about a
meeting, they're minutes. He's reporting what Dearlove report based on
his conversations with George Tenet in Washington, about what Tenet
thinks the state of play is, say, at the White House, and in the
administration.
That is quite a chain, isn't it? Isn't it possible that in fact these
may be the head of British intelligence's assessment, but he was wrong?
may be the head of British intelligence's assessment, but he was wrong?
RAY McGOVERN: No, I don't believe that that's possible at all. Who
would know better than the head of the CIA as to whether the
intelligence and facts were being fixed to fit the policy.
What we have here is a very interesting situation where the Britons,
the British were really in high dudgeon; they were being forced to go
along with this war, they were forced to make or allow the US to use
two of their bases in Cypress and in Diego Garcia and therefore become
ipso facto accomplices in this war, and their attorney general kept
saying in these documents a regime change has no legal basis for war.
the British were really in high dudgeon; they were being forced to go
along with this war, they were forced to make or allow the US to use
two of their bases in Cypress and in Diego Garcia and therefore become
ipso facto accomplices in this war, and their attorney general kept
saying in these documents a regime change has no legal basis for war.
And so they find themselves dancing around, trying to find some other
reason for war and they hit on the UN, but the UN is only raised in the
sense of let's propose the kind of strict regime for inspections that
we know Saddam Hussein will reject, and then we'll have a process,
really, then we can make war.
reason for war and they hit on the UN, but the UN is only raised in the
sense of let's propose the kind of strict regime for inspections that
we know Saddam Hussein will reject, and then we'll have a process,
really, then we can make war.
And Saddam Hussein of course outfoxed them, he accepted the most strict
regime of inspections in modern world history, and the UN went in there
and they were doing their job. When they found something that was above
and beyond the range allowed on one of these missiles, what happened?
Saddam Hussein allowed the UN inspectors to destroy about 90 of those
el-Samoud missiles.
regime of inspections in modern world history, and the UN went in there
and they were doing their job. When they found something that was above
and beyond the range allowed on one of these missiles, what happened?
Saddam Hussein allowed the UN inspectors to destroy about 90 of those
el-Samoud missiles.
So the inspection regime was working. The US policy had been set. And
it was set earlier than July of 2002. And there's lots of
circumstantial evidence for that. But as I say now we have a document,
an internal British document, firsthand. The fellow who wrote the
minutes was there, it was prepared the same day. He sent to it all the
people who there were -- there were 13. And there was no objection, and
Tony Blair has vouched for its authenticity. He has not denied that
this is an authentic document.
it was set earlier than July of 2002. And there's lots of
circumstantial evidence for that. But as I say now we have a document,
an internal British document, firsthand. The fellow who wrote the
minutes was there, it was prepared the same day. He sent to it all the
people who there were -- there were 13. And there was no objection, and
Tony Blair has vouched for its authenticity. He has not denied that
this is an authentic document.
So it's very interesting that finally people are getting interested
here and the Democrats who were confined to a basement room in the
bottom of the Capitol today still went ahead, all manner of
representatives showed up there, and you'll see a lot of this on the
press tonight.
here and the Democrats who were confined to a basement room in the
bottom of the Capitol today still went ahead, all manner of
representatives showed up there, and you'll see a lot of this on the
press tonight.
How the UN fits in
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Let me ask -- including on this program.
Reuel Gerecht, you're also an intelligence professional; how do you
read this sentence in the memo that Bush wanted to remove Saddam
through military action, two sentences, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD, but the intelligence and facts were being fixed
around the policy?
Reuel Gerecht, you're also an intelligence professional; how do you
read this sentence in the memo that Bush wanted to remove Saddam
through military action, two sentences, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD, but the intelligence and facts were being fixed
around the policy?
REUEL GERECHT: Well, one on the first part I would certainly hope that
the president of the United States after 9/11 would want to remove
Saddam Hussein because of the possibility that a rogue dictator who had
a long history of developing weapons of mass destruction, who had a
history of associating with terrorists, should in fact be removed; that
we now live in a post-9/11 world.
the president of the United States after 9/11 would want to remove
Saddam Hussein because of the possibility that a rogue dictator who had
a long history of developing weapons of mass destruction, who had a
history of associating with terrorists, should in fact be removed; that
we now live in a post-9/11 world.
MARGARET WARNER: And what is the second part?
REUEL GERECHT: On the second part, I mean that's a question that should
be put directly, I think, to the gentleman or have him explain it. I
mean I say again, I mean if you have to take that one sentence and
weigh it against the exhaustive treatment by the bipartisan commission
of the Robb-Silverman report, I think really you have to go with the
Robb-Silverman report and not the offhanded remark that you have here.
It certainly bears further investigation and would be very good if that
intelligence official would come forward and actually explain.
be put directly, I think, to the gentleman or have him explain it. I
mean I say again, I mean if you have to take that one sentence and
weigh it against the exhaustive treatment by the bipartisan commission
of the Robb-Silverman report, I think really you have to go with the
Robb-Silverman report and not the offhanded remark that you have here.
It certainly bears further investigation and would be very good if that
intelligence official would come forward and actually explain.
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Let me ask you about something else Mr.
McGovern raised, which had to do with the exercise at the U. N., and
there's a sentence here which Jack Straw, the foreign secretary is
saying that, you know, his weapons capability is less than that of
Libya, North Korea or Iran. Quote, we should work up a plan with an
ultimatum to Saddam to let back in the U. N. weapons inspectors, this
would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
McGovern raised, which had to do with the exercise at the U. N., and
there's a sentence here which Jack Straw, the foreign secretary is
saying that, you know, his weapons capability is less than that of
Libya, North Korea or Iran. Quote, we should work up a plan with an
ultimatum to Saddam to let back in the U. N. weapons inspectors, this
would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
And one conclusion of the meeting is that Straw will "discreetly work
up the ultimatum to Saddam." What does that say to you about the
exercise of going to the UN and all those fronts, was that on the
level?
up the ultimatum to Saddam." What does that say to you about the
exercise of going to the UN and all those fronts, was that on the
level?
REUEL GERECHT: Yeah. Well, I mean, I think what's going on there is, I
mean, the British are trying to develop, they have a much more, what
you might say legalistic ambition on the war.
mean, the British are trying to develop, they have a much more, what
you might say legalistic ambition on the war.
RAY McGOVERN: [Gr-r-r-r-rooooan...]
REUEL GERECHT: I mean they turn and want to have some law officers give
them an opinion of whether a war is right and just.
them an opinion of whether a war is right and just.
RAY McGOVERN: [Guffaw!]
REUEL GERECHT: In the United States -- that is the duty and
responsibility of the president of the United States and the Congress.
responsibility of the president of the United States and the Congress.
RAY McGOVERN: [Guffaw!]
REUEL GERECHT:We invest in them that responsibility and authority. I
mean what's striking about the memos, I have to say, is the extent to
which the bureaucracy in Great Britain, particularly the foreign
ministry, is actually very hesitant about going to war, and you come
away very much appreciating the boldness of Tony Blair, ---
mean what's striking about the memos, I have to say, is the extent to
which the bureaucracy in Great Britain, particularly the foreign
ministry, is actually very hesitant about going to war, and you come
away very much appreciating the boldness of Tony Blair, ---
RAY McGOVERN: [Guffaw!]
REUEL GERECHT: that in fact he agrees with President Bush, we live in a
post-9/11 world.
RAY McGOVERN: [Guffaw!]
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Mr. McGovern, you're dying to get back in,
I can tell.
post-9/11 world.
RAY McGOVERN: [Guffaw!]
MARGARET WARNER: All right. Mr. McGovern, you're dying to get back in,
I can tell.
RAY McGOVERN: No, I was just thinking that Reuel is of the school of
Richard Perle, who right after the war started was asked about the
legality of the war and he said, you know, sometimes you just have to
violate international law to do the right thing.
Richard Perle, who right after the war started was asked about the
legality of the war and he said, you know, sometimes you just have to
violate international law to do the right thing.
Two significant dinners
MARGARET WARNER: Then let me ask you, Mr. McGovern about -- this is now
one more memo, we cited it in our setup piece -- and this reports a
dinner between David Manning who was then Blair's national security
advisor, and he's now the ambassador here in Washington, who had dinner
with Condoleezza Rice who was then national security advisor.
MARGARET WARNER: Then let me ask you, Mr. McGovern about -- this is now
one more memo, we cited it in our setup piece -- and this reports a
dinner between David Manning who was then Blair's national security
advisor, and he's now the ambassador here in Washington, who had dinner
with Condoleezza Rice who was then national security advisor.
Quote, in March, Condi's enthusiasm for regime change is undimmed, but
there were some signs since we last spoke of greater awareness of the
practical difficulties and political risks. And later on he reports
also, I don't have the exact quote here, but that his belief is that
President Bush really does want to hear from Prime Minister Blair when
they meet in Crawford in April, which is the next month, before making
a final decision. Doesn't that suggest that at least in March, in fact,
the White House still was wrestling with whether to go?
there were some signs since we last spoke of greater awareness of the
practical difficulties and political risks. And later on he reports
also, I don't have the exact quote here, but that his belief is that
President Bush really does want to hear from Prime Minister Blair when
they meet in Crawford in April, which is the next month, before making
a final decision. Doesn't that suggest that at least in March, in fact,
the White House still was wrestling with whether to go?
RAY McGOVERN: Well, I'm not at all surprised that Condoleezza Rice
would tell David Manning that. After all, Tony Blair was coming to
Crawford, and she wasn't about to say, look, the decision has already
been made, we'll listen to you but we won't take your views into
account. No, that doesn't surprise me at all.
would tell David Manning that. After all, Tony Blair was coming to
Crawford, and she wasn't about to say, look, the decision has already
been made, we'll listen to you but we won't take your views into
account. No, that doesn't surprise me at all.
I would go back to an earlier conversation, and this happened on the
20th of September, 2001, so nine days after 9/11. This involved Tony
Blair, who was in Washington having dinner with the president. How do
we know about this? We know this because Christopher Meyer, the UK
ambassador, was there at the dinner, and he's written his memoirs.
20th of September, 2001, so nine days after 9/11. This involved Tony
Blair, who was in Washington having dinner with the president. How do
we know about this? We know this because Christopher Meyer, the UK
ambassador, was there at the dinner, and he's written his memoirs.
And what does he say? The conversation went like this. President Bush:
Tony we're going to Afghanistan in a week or two, but that won't take
long and we get out of there and go right into Iraq, are you with me
Tony? Are you with me? And Christopher Meyer says my goodness, it was
really, that Tony was sort of nonplused but he said yes sir, I'm with
you, Mr. President.
Tony we're going to Afghanistan in a week or two, but that won't take
long and we get out of there and go right into Iraq, are you with me
Tony? Are you with me? And Christopher Meyer says my goodness, it was
really, that Tony was sort of nonplused but he said yes sir, I'm with
you, Mr. President.
MARGARET WARNER: Mr. McGovern, speed up just a little because we're
almost out of time. Get to the next part.
almost out of time. Get to the next part.
RAY McGOVERN: Sure, okay, that's it.
MARGARET WARNER: So it's not about Iraq, it's about Afghanistan.
RAY McGOVERN: Well, no, no, this has to do with Iraq. What the
president said to Tony Blair on the 20th of September, according to the
UK ambassador who was there is, we're going into Afghanistan in a
couple of weeks, it won't take us long there and we're going right into
Iraq right after that. Are you with me? And Tony Blair said yes.
president said to Tony Blair on the 20th of September, according to the
UK ambassador who was there is, we're going into Afghanistan in a
couple of weeks, it won't take us long there and we're going right into
Iraq right after that. Are you with me? And Tony Blair said yes.
MARGARET WARNER: You get, I'm sorry to say, about five minutes -- five
seconds to respond.
seconds to respond.
REUEL GERECHT: I would like to believe it's true. I think the
appropriate criticism of the Bush administration is that it should have
made the decision to go to war sooner so we could have had a better
discussion about what we were going to do.
appropriate criticism of the Bush administration is that it should have
made the decision to go to war sooner so we could have had a better
discussion about what we were going to do.
MARGARET WARNER: On that I think we probably still have disagreement.
Thank you both.
Thank you both.
RAY McGOVERN: Thank you.
REUEL GERECHT: A pleasure.
Copyright ©2005 MacNeil/Lehrer Productions. All Rights Reserved.
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